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THE SEVENTH LETTER AND THE SOCRATIC METHOD
Sherman J. Clark*
Law teachers use the phrase “Socratic method” loosely to refer to
various methods of questioning students in class rather than merely
lecturing to them. The merits of such teaching have been the subject of
spirited and even bitter debate. It can be perceived as not only inefficient
but also unnecessarily combative—even potentially abusive. Although it
is clear that some critics are excoriating the least defensible versions of
what has been called the Socratic method, I do not attempt to canvas or
adjudicate that debate in this brief essay. Rather, I hope to add to the
conversation by looking to a document that describes the origin and
original aim of this method. If our teaching practices have indeed been
abased or abused such that they too-often resemble the most pejorative
caricatures, perhaps we can recover a better and more appealing vision
of our tradition by looking to its purported roots.
In a long letter attributed to Plato, there are two brief passages in
which the author explains why he chooses to teach through questioning
and conversation rather than through written treatises or lectures, and
why those seeking to cultivate certain sorts of wisdom should follow his
example.1 I suggest that these passages have been misunderstood, and
that a reinterpretation may help illuminate not only Plato’s work but also
our own.
The heart of the matter, which The Seventh Letter can help us
explore, is the following: Socratic conversation is not merely a method
of instruction but also a sort of practice—not merely a mode of doctrinal
exposition but also, and more essentially, a kind of capacity-building
experience. Or so it should be. We often contrast classroom teaching
with experiential learning or practical training. That distinction is useful,
and makes sense on many levels, but at bottom the dichotomy is false.
The sort of teaching that Socrates did, that Plato described, and to which
we should aspire, is primarily and essentially an experiential practice. It
should model and embody as well as possible an important aspect of
what we hope our students will learn to do well.

* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1.
PLATO, THE SEVENTH LETTER (John Harward trans., 1928).
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I. THE SEVENTH LETTER
I do not claim that law teachers are actually relying on Plato’s
description of the Socratic method when we do the sorts of teaching to
which we give that name. We in fact pay little attention to Plato or
Socrates when we think and argue about how to teach. I suggest that we
should. Like them, we often eschew easier and more obviously efficient
teaching methods—such as lecturing and the use of textbooks—in favor
of a certain sort of difficult and challenging conversation. Why do we do
this? What sort of knowledge or wisdom do we think is best developed
in this way? How does this way of teaching work, if indeed it works at
all? And if we think it can work, how can we do it better? Plato’s
depiction of the Socratic method, properly understood, can help us think
about these questions, and thus can help us develop ways of teaching
worthy of their name.
With that aim in mind, here are the relevant passages of The Seventh
Letter—as traditionally translated:2
There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the
subject. For it does not admit of exposition like other branches
of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself
and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled
in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and
thereafter sustains itself.3
....
. . . [I]n the course of scrutiny and kindly testing by men who
proceed by question and answer without ill will, with a sudden
flash there shines forth understanding about every problem, and
an intelligence whose efforts reach the furthest limits of human
powers.4

2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 7.342c–d (John Harward trans., 1928) (“Οὔκουν ἐµόν γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔστιν
σύγγραµµα οὐδὲ µήποτε γένηται· ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαµῶς ἐστιν ὡς ἄλλα µαθήµατα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ πολλῆς
συνουσίας γιγνοµένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγµα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος
ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόµενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει.”).
4.
Id. at 7.344b–c (John Harward trans., 1928) (“ἐν εὐµενέσιν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόµενα καὶ ἄνευ
φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσιν καὶ ἀποκρίσεσιν χρωµένων, ἐξέλαµψε φρόνησις περὶ ἕκαστον καὶ νοῦς,
συντείνων ὅτι µάλιστ᾽ εἰς δύναµιν ἀνθρωπίνην.”)
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In our effort to think about how this text might be re-understood so
as to shed light on the relationship between how we teach and what we
hope to help our students learn, it is worth paying some attention to the
original Greek text.
Begin with the word, “ἐξαίφνης” [“exaifnes”], which is translated in
the first-quoted passage above as “suddenly.” Read this way, the passage
suggests something instantaneous and mystical—as if one should expect
some sort of “aha!” moment in which knowledge or comprehension
flash upon the brain. The implication is that there is information that we
as teachers cannot, or will not, explain to students, but which we expect
them simply to grasp. This stance is potentially appealing to teachers,
because it suggests that we need not defend our teaching methods—
because this material cannot be taught. We might be tempted to fall back
on vague claims that students must just somehow get it. Couple this with
statements earlier in The Seventh Letter to the effect that only those with
a “true philosophic temperament” will be able to grasp the truth, and we
have a ready-made set of excuses if and when our students fail to
experience this sudden and mysterious flash of insight.5
This is, of course, unsatisfactory and a source of great dissatisfaction
among students. If we are merely unwilling or unable to explain difficult
doctrines, and then seek to hide behind mysterious claims about flashes
of insight—or, even worse, implicitly blame the purported inadequacies
of our students—there is no wonder this sort of teaching is disliked and
disparaged. It should be. We either need to develop a better
understanding and explanation for what we are doing, or we need to stop
doing it.
Translating the word ἐξαίφνης as “suddenly,” in this context gets
the connotation wrong because it suggests that the learning itself will
necessarily be sudden, whereas here the better understanding is that the
hoped-for growth may take place without the student being consciously
aware of it as it happens. The word is an alternate form of the adverb
“ἄφνω,” which is more often translated as “unawares,” reflecting its
roots—”ἀπο”
(“away from,” “out of”) and “νοϋς” (“mind,”
“perception”). Reading “ἐξαίφνης” in this way deemphasizes the
temporal component and highlights that whatever is supposed to happen
through this process of teaching and learning does not necessarily
happen quickly, or suddenly, but rather in a way that goes unnoticed as it
happens. The temporal connotation is not entirely inappropriate, as the
awareness of what has taken place may indeed strike one suddenly, just
as one up before dawn might suddenly realize that the sun has risen and
5.

Id. at 7.340d (John Harward trans., 1928).
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it is light. But, it is the awareness that is sudden, not the event. In fact,
the event—here the learning—may actually have been very gradual,
which is why it can go unnoticed.
In this light, consider one more Greek word from The Seventh
Letter—”ἐξέλαµψε” [“exelampse”], which is translated in this part of the
second passage quoted above as “shines forth”: “. . . with a sudden flash
there shines forth understanding . . . .”6 As a preliminary matter, the text
does not warrant including the phrase “with a sudden flash,” as in the
original translation. The verb “ἐξέλαµψε” is unmodified by any
adverbial phrase in the original text. The translator’s adverbial phrase
can only be explained as an effort to emphasize what is seen as the
appropriate connotation of suddenness. But, as we have seen, that is
mistaken.
The verb “ἐξέλαµψε” is a form of “ἐκλάµπω,” which does in fact
mean “shine forth.” But, even correctly translated, the term can be
misinterpreted—a misinterpretation made more likely by the
unwarranted insertion of adverbs denoting suddenness. The appropriate
connotation is not of knowledge that flashes into the mind of the learner.
Rather, the better reading is that something shines forth from those who
have spent time learning in that way. This is highlighted by the εκprefix, which signifies “out of” or “from.” So what we are looking for is
not something that is poured into the mind of the student, but rather
something that shines forth from it.
This is the key insight for a law teacher seeking to learn from the
purported source of our teaching tradition. The sort of learning that
happens in this way is not knowledge of facts or doctrine, but rather of
capacities. We are not merely trying to impart information, or even to
teach skills in the narrow sense of that term. We also hope to cultivate
capacities and habits of mind that will serve our students throughout
their lives as lawyers, citizens and human beings.
II. TEACHING THE LAW AND DEVELOPING THE LAWYER
In thinking about what we can learn from this understanding of the
original and essential aims of Socratic conversation, it is fair to
acknowledge that different teachers will have different aims. How we
teach ought to depend on what it is we hope our students will learn. To
the extent that our aim is merely to teach doctrine, we might use other
more efficient methods to do so. Indeed, there are circumstances, such as

6.

Id. (emphasis added).
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when teaching a particularly complex set of rules, when all of us should
and do simply lecture. But often, and more fundamentally, thoughtful
law teachers strive to teach doctrine and skills in ways that also nurture
the deeper capacities our students will need.
What do we hope students will learn—not suddenly but perhaps
“unawares”—as a result of the sort of conversation Plato describes?
What capacities do we hope will “shine forth” from those who have
studied in this way? The answer is straightforward, but that does not
mean it is easy, or that we should fail to appreciate its value.
What shines forth from those who have lived and learned as Plato
described is the capacity to do just what he describes in the letter and
depicts in the Socratic dialogues—to share in a kind but testing
scrutiny,7 questioning and answering,8 without ill will,9 about each of the
things that concern us,10 in a way that can then sustain itself,11 and which
comes about not just through what we say, but through a life lived
together.12 What we aim to engender, in addition to doctrinal knowledge
and professional skills narrowly defined, is the capacity for a certain sort
of conversation. We hope that our students will develop the ability to
question and answer without ill will in a way that will support and
sustain their work and our community life.
This capacity is important, even central, to lawyers in a range of
ways. It makes us more persuasive advocates because it enables us to
engage with and thus find space in the worldviews of those we aim to
persuade. It makes us better counselors because it allows us to hear and
better understand those we would guide. It is valuable to us as citizens
and leaders because it allows us to participate in and facilitate the sort of
deliberation vital to democratic politics. Finally, this capacity for kind
and testing scrutiny Plato describes is valuable to us as individuals—not
only because it helps us work better with others in a range of contexts,
but also because it helps us learn from others, and thus grow and thrive
as human beings. If we are able to nurture this capacity, we are doing
something worthy of the name we often give our teaching. It is, in that
sense, Socratic indeed.
And the results of our teaching, if we are successful, will not be
sudden, in the sense of an identifiable moment of substantive insight. It
will be gradual—as is the growth of most valuable capacities. Indeed, it

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 7.344b–c (John Harward trans., 1928) (“ἐν εὐµενέσιν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόµενα”).
Id. (“ἐρωτήσεσιν καὶ ἀποκρίσεσιν”).
Id. (“ἄνευ φθόνων”).
Id. (“περὶ ἕκαστον”).
Id. (“αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει”).
Id, (“συζῆν”).
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is likely to grow unnoticed. An athlete in training does not anticipate
some sudden moment in which she becomes fit and fast. Indeed, while
training, she will often feel slow, tired, and frustrated—until at some
point she realizes she can run or swim or ride faster and farther than she
once could. So too, our aim is that through the process of Socratic
teaching, our students will gradually become, and eventually realize that
they have become, better able to engage in the sort of conversation Plato
described.
III. THE SOCRATIC CLASSROOM AS EXAMPLE AND EXPERIENCE
We recognize, therefore, that our aim is to nurture a capacity that
will emerge gradually and perhaps without conscious awareness. This
recognition, however, presents us with a problem. If we cannot check the
progress of our teaching by looking for identifiable moments of sudden
insight, or even by testing doctrinal knowledge, how do we know we are
teaching in the way we should? How can we best ensure that we are
nurturing the capacity we hope to nurture, rather than merely frustrating
our students to no good end? The answer is that we should strive above
all to enact and model in the classroom the form of conversation we
hope our students will develop the capacity to conduct. And to that end
we can take Plato’s description not just as our goal but also as our guide.
Of course, the best source of information about the origin and aims
of this sort of conversation is not Plato’s purported description of it in a
letter, but rather his depiction of it in the Socratic dialogues. I lack not
only the space here but even the capacity to describe the rich and layered
combination of friendship, rigor, irony, humor, and insight that pervade
the Socratic dialogues. Indeed, even the finest translators, forced to
choose which of many layers to try to convey, tend to emphasize the
logic-chopping and argumentation over the gentle firmness that
characterized Socrates’s conversations with his friends. This conceals
that the experience of those conversations, rather than merely the
doctrinal content, is the essence of what they help us learn. And missing
the experience of these conversations reinforces the notion of Socratic
dialogue as a bad way of teaching doctrine, rather than a potentially
good way of nurturing the capacity for a certain sort of conversation. So
we should be grateful that Plato made the effort in his letter to describe
for us, however briefly, what he depicted so much more fully in his art.
Most obviously, this vision—of a “kind but testing scrutiny,
questioning and answering without ill will”—leaves little or no room for
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embarrassing students in the name of rigor.13 Our students need and
deserve from us the sort of scrutiny Plato describes, but they neither
need nor deserve our bullying. Sometimes we can be tempted to draw a
dichotomy between rigor and sensitivity—disparaging the latter with
terms like, “PC” or “touchy feely.” But that dichotomy too is false. As
teachers we can ask harder questions, and press harder on students’
answers, if we create an environment of authentic conversation. The
competitive gamesmanship that can sometimes characterize what we call
the Socratic method is anathema to, and certainly cannot be trusted to
help engender, the sort of capacity we hope to nurture.
The conversation must be an authentic conversation, in which the
teacher actually listens and responds to what students say. There are few
things more frustrating to a thoughtful student than having a valuable
insight ignored because it does not happen to be the next thing in the
teacher’s notes or framed in just the way the teacher expected. We have
all seen this—where a purported question is really just a prompt for an
expected answer that will fit into the teacher’s predetermined script. A
teacher who refuses to depart from the order of his or her teaching notes
and engage a student’s actual thought is not conducting the sort of
conversation Plato described and Socrates enacted. He or she is simply
lecturing inefficiently—with the aid of an annoying game of “guess what
I am thinking.” We cannot model or engender the capacity for genuine
engagement if we are not capable of it ourselves.
Plato also describes this sort of conversation as one that can “sustain
itself” and that forms part of “a life lived together.”14 And in the end this
is perhaps the best standard against which to judge our Socratic teaching.
Are we conducting and thus constructing the capacity for a kind of
discourse that not only survives beyond the classroom walls but which,
once beyond those walls, will be constructive rather than destructive of
community life? Are we nurturing a form of firm but friendly scrutiny
that is conducive to deliberation and counsel, rather than to bullying and
competition? Are we engendering the capacity to disagree and deliberate
without ill will, rather than in a way that will cause ill will to fester? Is
the sort of conversation we are conducting in our classrooms the sort of
conversation we would like to have and hear in our communities?
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF THE SOCRATIC METHOD
In one sense our job is harder than that faced by Socrates. We do
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 7.344b–c (John Harward trans., 1928) (“συζῆν”).
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have to teach doctrine. We have to make sure that our efforts to
engender deeper capacities enhance and deepen, rather than distract
from, the learning of doctrine and specific professional skills. Even more
frustrating and counterproductive than a teacher who ignores an
authentic insight, is a teacher who allows a single student to sidetrack an
entire class at the expense of teaching the material that all of the students
need to learn. So, if we hope to develop in our students deeper
capacities, we must do it in a way that clarifies rather than clouds our
students’ understanding of the more concrete substantive material. We
need to do both. And that is difficult.
One might object that this sort of conversation is particularly ill
suited to the large first-year law school classes where variations of the
Socratic method are most often employed. Socrates in his dialogues
talked most often with several friends at a time, not with several dozen.
This point is well taken, and if the method were valuable only for those
who are actually called upon to speak on a given day, it would not be
worth using in large classes. But this sort of conversation, if wellconducted, does not only benefit those who are speaking. Indeed, the
Socratic method can be difficult for students who are called upon to
respond to questions. A nervous or uncertain student, in particular, might
well find that this sort of conversation—no matter how humanely
employed—produces more stress than illumination. We should strive to
reduce that stress, of course, and to help the student realize that he or she
can handle and learn to embrace authentic, challenging dialogue.
But those who are less-direct participants in a particular day’s
conversation can learn a great deal as well. If we get it right, all students
witness daily the “kind but testing scrutiny” emblematic of authentic
Socratic discourse. The method works in the classroom, therefore, not
just, or even primarily, through the engagement of a particular student in
the sort of conversation we hope to engender. It also, and essentially,
works by modeling that sort of conversation for everyone. None of us
ever spoke with Socrates, but we benefit from our vicarious engagement
with his conversations. Moreover, it is not clear how much some of
Socrates’s interlocutors learned from their talks with him, but we can
learn a great deal from those talks. In this light, we realize that every
time we speak with or listen to a particular student—every time we
“question and answer without ill will”—we are showing all of our
students how a thoughtful and ethical lawyer speaks, listens, questions,
and answers.
Or so we should be. This realization highlights the extent to which
bullying and gamesmanship are not merely useless and mean, but,
moreover, undercut the essential aim of Socratic teaching. When we
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abuse our power and abase our tradition in those ways, we are modeling
and thus potentially engendering habits of mind and ways of lawyering
in direct opposition to those we should most hope our students will
develop.
Of course, learning through attention to and vicarious engagement
with Socratic conversation will take place only to the extent that students
are paying attention and engaged. Not to put too fine a point on it, good
Socratic teaching must not only avoid worrying and bullying students; it
must also avoid wasting their time and boring them. Plodding through
the elements of a cause of action does not engender anything in the rest
of the class other than the desire to check their email.
That is why the best Socratic teachers do not engage in long dull
exchanges with particular students about aspects of the law that could be
more easily read by students or explained by us. Rather, we need to keep
the class moving, get to and engage the hard and interesting questions,
and evince and help our students experience the deeply human pleasure
of insight and engagement. Good and authentic Socratic conversation is
fun and alive—it engages and commands the attention of even those not
directly on the spot.
Teaching well in this way requires a firm and deep grasp of the
material, a thorough but flexible plan for the day’s class, a sense of pace,
the intellectual agility to see connections between issues, a deft touch in
grasping a student’s perhaps poorly articulated insight and tying it into a
deepened understanding of the material at hand.
V. SOCRATIC HUMILITY
It may be objected that what I have tried to describe here is
somehow elitist and out of touch with the real needs of most students. It
may be suggested, for example, that most law students at most law
schools find it difficult enough just to learn doctrine and develop
technical skills, and that we are merely distracting from this end with our
efforts to engender the capacity for the sort of conversation Plato
describes. In response I would say two things: first, as I have repeatedly
tried to emphasize, I reject the implicit dichotomy. Second, in a sense it
is this critique that is elitist, by assuming that only some students can
handle authentic conversation. Every student at every school is capable
of developing this capacity to some extent, and deserves the chance to
do so. More to the point, we should have the intellectual humility to be
open to the possibility that every time a student raises his or her hand—
any student at any school—he or she may have an insight or perspective
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that has never occurred to us.
That said, however, I do acknowledge that there is some validity to
the observation that not every classroom will afford equal space for the
appropriate use of Socratic conversation. Intellectual humility should not
mean intellectual dishonesty, even in the name of egalitarian respect. So,
we need to recognize what our students need. They will not all be
Glaucon, or even Adeimantus. Students who are struggling to grasp the
doctrine require more explanations, which, perhaps unfortunately, leaves
less room for authentic conversation. But when we are blessed with
students who can master material quickly, and who have insights about
that material, we owe it to them to match our teaching to their talents.
But, intellectual humility does very much mean that we should be
honest about our own intellectual and pedagogical limitations. This sort
of teaching is not easy; and not everyone will be good at it. Having
acknowledged that not all of our students are Glaucon, we should be at
least as willing to recognize how far we are from being Socrates. So, not
every teacher should do this sort of teaching. It is rather like being an
instructor at a basketball camp. Becoming a better basketball player, like
becoming a better lawyer, is as much about developing capacities as
acquiring knowledge. And so, much instruction at a basketball camp is
done by coaches who can play. The coaches get on the court with the
campers and show them what the moves look like, even as they teach
them the technical information they need. But, that only works if the
coach can hoop. The camp might wisely employ some instructors who
are not good players, but who bring other skills—conditioning trainers,
rules experts, or coaches good at diagramming plays. And those trainers,
experts, and coaches would provide valuable parts of the players’
training. They should do what they do—instruct, explain, diagram. But,
they should not try to get on the court and run the pick and roll.
So too must each of us who teaches law be honest with ourselves
about what we have to offer our students. Is it primarily doctrinal
expertise? Perhaps just lecture. Is it technical skills? Perhaps one could
employ practical exercises of some sort. But, if we believe we have the
capacity to model for them and carry on with them the kind of discourse
described and depicted by Plato, and thus help nurture in them the
capacity for that form of discourse, we need to roll up our sleeves and
try to do it well.
Finally, this brief essay leaves largely unanswered, and intentionally
so, an important set of questions—perhaps the most important set of
questions. Why and in what way is it important for lawyers to develop,
along with doctrinal knowledge and professional skills, narrowly
defined, the capacity for this sort of conversation? I have suggested
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tentative answers—that this capacity helps us be more persuasive
advocates, more thoughtful counselors, more effective citizens, and
perhaps even happier people. But these answers are necessarily partial,
and form part of a larger inquiry that I hope here to open rather than
answer—to frame rather than foreclose.
And the larger inquiry is contained in the following. What traits and
capacities do we most hope our students will develop? What are the
hallmarks of a good and ethical lawyer? How might those conduce to or
be components of a rich and full life as a whole? And then, how are
those traits and capacities nurtured and developed? What role, if any,
can legal education play in the process? And finally, in light of those
considerations, how should we teach? These questions are beyond the
scope of this essay, but they should be on the minds of all of us who
teach law and who will play a role in the development and evolution of
legal education.

